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Specific divestiture dates and institutional public enterprise re-
form should probably not be a matter of hard conditionality for
sectoral adjustment lending. One altemative is to establish insti-
tutional development projects that parallel adjustment opera-
tions. Another is to establish "primary conditions," nonfulfill-
ment of which would bring an operation to a halt, and"secondary
conditions'S  (including most institutional and public enterprise
reforms), nonfulfillment  of which wouldevoke sanctions  but not
end operations.
The Policy. Planning, and Research  Complex disuibutes PPR Working Paprs  to disseminate the findings of work in progress and to
encourage the exchange of ideas among Bank staff and all others interested i1 development issues. These papers carry the names of
the authors, reflec only their  views, and should be used and cited accordingly.  The findings, interpretaticns, and conclusions are the
















































































































dAdjustmnent  operations  have required  or re-  orises  (PEs)  but most PE reform  being instituted
quested:  through  adjustFnent  can be seen as preliminary
or "brush-clearing"  steps.  These steps  have
* Divestiture  (in its many forms).  reduced  the burden  on the budget,  but it is
unclear  whether  the reformns  will promote
P  Policy changes, particularly about pricing,  efficiency.
* Enterprise  use of fewer and better managed  The World  Bank should  continue  to move
resources, including labor.  away, in adjustment conditionality, from speci-
fying  numbers  of PEs to be sold by date X-
•  Better guidance and evaluatiorn  by the state.  which is counterproductive. The divestiture
process is too uncertain for date setting, particu-
q Restructuring and rehabilitation at the firh  larly in the short  an.  It also appears unwise to
level.  make purely institutional PE reforms a matter of
hard conditionality, because they require more
Acioss the board - but particularly in con-  time than several SALs.  Institutional develop-
nection with institutional management, guid-  ment projects that parlel  adjustment operations
ance, and performance evaluation - much  may be one solution.
remains to be done. There is little information
about the post-privatization performance of  The Bank might also consider establishing
divested firms and disturbingly little evidence  "primary conditions" (a few key, clear, easily
that efficiency gains account for the perceived  moimtored  objectives, nonfulfilument  of which
financial improvement in many enterprises - would bring an operation  o a halt) and "secon-
which are probably attributable to investment  dary conditions" (including most institutional
cuts and price increases in monopolies.  and PE reforms in general), nonfulfillment of
which would evoke sanctions but not end
Many governments have reduced the flow of  operations.
resources into poorly performing public enter-
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contact Rose Malcolm, room N9-055, extension 61708 (27 pages with tables).
The PPR Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy, Plarming, and Research
Complex. An objective of the series is to get these findings out quickly, even if presentatioi s are less than fully polished.
The findings, interpretations. and conclusions in these papers do not necessarily represent official policy of the Bank.
Produced at the PPR Dissemination CenterPUBLIC  ENTERPRISE  REFORM IN  ADJUSTMENT  LENDING
I  The  Problem
Tne  performance  of  public  enterprises  in  developing  countries
has not  generally  lived  up to the  expectations  of creators  and  funders.
They  have  not generated  anticipated  rates  of return  on  equity  invested.
Nor,  all  too  often,  have  they  attained  projected  non-commercial
objectives  --  with  regard  to employment  generation,  technology  transfer
and  regional  development,  for  prime  examples. Nor,  frequently,  has
performance  reached  anticipated  levels  of  economic  productivity  and
efficiency.  There  is  considerable  variation  in  performance  from  region
to  region,  with  Asian  countries  showing  fewer  problems  than  Latin
Ame:ican  public  enterprise  sectors,  which,  in turn,  generally  perform
better  than  enterprises  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. While  every  country
possesses  a  number  of  profitable  enterprises  (though  many  of these  are
exploiting  a  protected  or  monopoly  position),  and  some  of these
enterprises  are  sound  even  when  measured  by the  most  strict  economic
criteria,  there  are  still  too  many  money-losing,  inefficient  public
enterprises  in developing  countries.
At the  level  of the  individual  enterprises,  the  details  of  poor
performance  have  been  known  for  some  time. Numerous  attempts  to resolve
problems  have  been  made,  frequently  in  conjunction  with  World  Bank
pro7ect  lending. Despite  perceptible  improvements  in  many  firms  in
technology,  training  and  managerial  procedures,  performance  levels  --  as2
measured  by the  traditional  criteria  of profitability,  or rates  of
return  on investment,  and  self-financing  ratios  --  have  all  too  often
stagnated  or  worsened.
Reviews  of  project  lending  concluded  that  many  of the  factors
contributing  to  poor  enterprise  performance  were  external  to  the  firm,
outside  the  control  of  management.  Deficient  macroeconomic  policy,
uneconomic  pricing  regimes,  the  lack  of clearly  defined  objectives  for
individual  enterprises  or sub-sectors  of enterprises,  conflicts  and
shortcomings  in the  legal  and  regulatory  framework,  overly  easy  access
to  the  banking  and  credit  system,  weak financial  structures,  ineffective
or interfering  monitoring  systems  and  chaotic  budgetary  relations  --
given  these  common  circumstances,  even  dynamic  and  competent  management,
working  with  high quality  equipment,  may  be incapable  of generu-ting
decent  returns. Conversely,  good  financial  returns  are  sometimes  a
function  of distortions,  and  are  not  due  to the  efforts  of  management.
These  realizations  constituted  the  fundamental  justification  for  the
inclusion  of public  enterprise  sectors  in adjustment  operations: Since
piecemeal  and  particularistic  reforms  have  proven  to  be insufficient,
then  the  logical  alternative  is to  attempt  systemic  revision  of policy
and  procedures.
II.  Attempted  Reforms  of State-Owned  Enterprises  in  Adiustment
Pi.otrams
Number  and  Location
The  first  Bank-sponsored  attempt  to reform  public  enterprises
in  a systemic,  cross-sectoral  manner  was  the  Senegal  Parapublic
project. This  became  effective  in 1978,  three  years  before  the  first
Senegal  Strucutural  Adjustment  Loan (SAL). Between  1982  and  1984,  a few
other  Bank-assisted  public  enterprise  (PE)  reform  programs  --  in the
form  of loans  to fund  technical  assistance  --  took  place  outside  the
framework  of a  structural  or  sectoral  adjustment  operation;  in3
Table  I
SALs  with  SOf  Components
(as  of  March  1988)
Region  Approved  Proposed
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with  SOe  Comprxnents
. ..........................................
CApproved  as of  March 1988)
Ln/Cr  Board  Ln/Cr
Country  Operation  Number  Approval  Amount
(USSm)
.................................................................................................
Pakistan  Fertilizer  Imports  1066  80/09  50.0
tanzanfa  Export  Rehabilitation  1133  81/04  50.0
Malawi  Smaltholder  Fart.  1352  83/04  5.0
Sudan  Agriculture  Rehab.  II  1389  43/06  50.0
Ghan  Export  Rehabilitation  1435  84/01  76.0
Zambia  Export Rehab.&  OIversif.  2391  84/03  75.0
Sangtadesh  Textile  Industry  Rehab.  it  1477  84/05  23.0
Sierra  Leone  AgricuLture  Sector  1501  84/06  21.5
Philippines  Agriculture  Sector/inputs  2469  84/09  150.0
Guinea lissau  Reconstruction  tEports  1531  84/12  10.0
Madagascar  Industrfal  Assistance  1541  85/01  40.0
Zasbia  Agriculture  Rehab.  1545  85/01  25.0
Ghana  Reconstruction  Imports It  1573  85/03  60.0
Mauritania  PE  TA and Rehab.  1567  85/03  16.4
Pakfstan  Energy Sector  2552  8S/05  178.0
Korea  Second  nd.  finance  2571  85/06  222.0
Morocco  Agriculture  Sector  2590  85/06  100.0
Turkey  Agriculture  Sector  2585  85/06  300.0
Morocco  Second  ItPA  2604  85/07  200.0
Ecuador  Agriculture  Sector  2626  85/10  100.0
Zambia  Industrial  Reorientation  1630  85/10  20.0
Kauritania  SNIM  Rehabilitation  2643  85/12  20.0
Zambia  Fertilizer  Industry  Restruc.  1662  86/02  10.0
Ghana  Industrial  Sector Adj.  1672  86/03  28.5
Bolivia  Reconstru tion  Imports  1703  86/05  5!.0
Hungary  Ind.  Restructuring  2700  86/05  100.0
Madagascar  Agriculture  Sector  1691  86/05  20.0
Pakistan  Export  Development  2701  86/05  70o0
Kenya  Agriculture  Sector  1717  86/06  20.0
Somalia  Ag. Sec. Adj.  1711  86/06  30.0
Zaire  Industrial  Sector  1708  86/06  20.0
Zambia  Recovery  Program  1720  86/06  50.0
Nigeria  Trade  Policy  and  Exp.  Devt.  2758  86/10  452.0
Tanzania  Multi-Sector  Rehab.  1741  86/11  50.0
Indonesia  Trade  Policy  2780  87/02  300.0
Tunisia  Industry  and  Trade  2781  87/02  150.0
Haiti  Economic  Recovery  1766  87/03  40.0
Philippines  Economic  Recovery  2788  87/03  310.0
Argentina  Trade  Policy  9  Exp.  Diversif.  2815  87/05  500.0
Morocco  PE  Rationalization  2820  87/05  240.0
Bangladesh  Industrial  Sector  1816  87/06  190.0
Jamafca  PE  Sector  Adj.  2849  87/06  20.0
Madagascar  Ind.  Trade  Policy  1834  87/06  67.0
Niger  PE  Sector  Adj.  1823  87/06  60.0
Turkey  Energy  Sector  2856  87/06  325.0
Colombia  Power  Sector  2889  87/12  300.0
Mexico  Fertilizer  Sector  88/03  265.05
Madagascar,  Peru,  Mauretania,  Mali  and  Congo. All  other  cases  have  been
an integral  part  of,  or closely  associated  with,  adjustment  lending. As
of March,  1988,  the  number  of such  operations  totaled  101 --  51 in SALs
and  50 in  sector  adjustment  loans. 1 PE reforms  have  been an element  of
almost  every  adjustment  operation,  structural  or sectoral.
In  keeping  with  perceived  deficiencies  in  performance,  there
have  been  many  more actions  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  than  elsewhere. Out
of a total  number  of SALs  approved  by the  Board,  twenty-six  have taken
place  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (in  seventeen  different  countries).  There
were PE  com-ponents  in all  twenty-six  of these  loans. The  regional
distribution  picture  is summarized  in  Table  1.
The situation  for  sectoral  adjustment  operations  (SECALs)  is
more complicated.  Sectoral  adjustment  loans  specifically  and  uniquely
devoted  to  public  enterprise  reform  have  been  approved  in  six  countries:
Jamaica,  Mauretania,  Morocco,  Benin,  Niger  and  the  Philippines. Similar
projects,  commonly  refered  to  as PERLs  (public  enterprise  restructuring
loans),  are in  preparation  in  at least  six  more  countries. But  public
enterprise  reform  --  of  policy  issues,  pricing  matters,  relations
between  the  state  and  the  PEs,  staffing,  training,  financial  and
managerial  restructuring  at the  level  of the  firm  --  have also  figured
in a  very large  percentage  of the  other  44 SECALs  approved  between  1980
and  March  of 1988.  In  many  of these  loans,  especially  those  to the
agricultural  and industrial  sectors,  public  enterprise  components  have
been  key.  Table  2 shows  the  regional  and  sectoral  breakdown  of SECALs
involving  public  enterprises  components.
1/ Since  many  countries  have  had  several  adjustment  loans  or credits
affecting  the  PE sector,  the  total.  number  of  borrowers  with  PE-
related  adjustment  operations  is less  than  100. Moreover,  counts
vary according  to  how one  classifies  reform  activities;  an April,
1989  count  of the  Bank's  Industry  Department  concluded  that  83,
rather  than  101,  operations  contained  PE actions.6
Nature  of  Reforms  Attempted
There  is  a  basic  similarity  to  he  reform  packages  proposed  and
implemented.  Cross-sectoral  improvement  activities  have fallen  under
three  general  headings:
- reforms  of the  macroeconomic  policy  and  financial  frameworks
affecting  PE  performance;
- reforms  of the  institutional  framework  (ways  in  which  the  government
guides,  supervises  and  evaluates  PEs);  and
- issues  of divestiture.
In  addition,  more than  half  of all  PE  components  of adjustment
loans  have  contained  elements  aimed  at the  restructuring  and  improvement
of specific  enterprises.  The  justifying  reasoning  has  been that
including  the  most important  and  se"tsitive  enterprise-level  reforms  in s
visible  and  sizeable  adjustment  operation  should  increase  the  likelihood
of  painful  reforms  --  layoffs,  financial  restructurings,  plant  closures,
price  increases  --  actually  being  enacted. Making  enterprise  level
reforms  conditions  of  an adjustment  operation  appeals  to  Bank  project
officers  and  frustrated  government  staff  alike;  but the  practice  does
add  to the  number  and  complexity  of conditions.  Improvements  in
specific  enterprises  have  figured  in  over  forty  operations;  in  many  of
the  more  recent  and  important  PE  reform  programs  the  resources  devoted
to  enterprise  rehabilitation  are  equal  to or  greater  than  the  funds
spent  on cross-sectoral  reforms. (The  specifics  of enterprise
rehabilitation  are  reviewed  below.)
Reform  of the  Policy  Framework
An adjustment  operation,  especially  one  with  an PE component,
inevitably  raises  questions  of the  proper  role,  or the  redefinition  of
the  role,  of the  state.  Most PE-related  adjustment  programs,  and  all
those  approved  after  1984,  thus  propose  some  actions  --  often  backed  up
by conditionality  --  related  to this  broadest  policy  issue. Actions7
include: (i)  expenditures  on studies  analyzing  and  clarifying  the
state's  policy  on  what  economic  activities  it should  and  should  not
perform; (ii)  classifications  of  enterprises  into  those  to  be retained,
restructured,  sold  or  closed; (iii)  identification  of specific
enterprises  to  be sold  or closed,  or of sub-sectors  in  which
privatization  will  take  place,  or accompanying  measures  to facilitate  or
support  such  sales. One  maior  distinction  in these  loans  is  between
those  countries  in  which  studies  and  policy  reform  preparatory  to
divestiture  is  taking  place  --  in  operations  in  Turkey,  Congo  and
Morocco,  for  example  --  and  those  which  have  moved  into  the  action  stage
of sale  and  liquidation  --  such  as in  Jamaica,  Niger,  Togo,  Panama  and
Guinea.
A modest  number  of  adjustment  operations  has addressed  the
issue  of the  elimination  of monogolies  and  monoRsonies  in  PEs.  This  has
been the  subject  of conditionaiity  in ten  SALs  and  six  SECALs. More
rare  have  been  attempts  to  place  public  and  private  enterprises  on an
equal  regulatory  footing,  though  the  Niger  SAL  abolished  tax  exemptions
for  PEs. Trade  liberalization  measure  are  much  more  commonly  advocated,
in  about  half the  SALs  with  PE components,  and  are  either  aimed  at or
have an effect  on industrial  and  manufacturing  PEs. Another  general
policy  area  is that  of legal  and  legislative  reform,  which  has figured
in  the  PE/adjustment  operations  throughout  francophone  Africa,  and  in
Turkey. Clarifying  the  juridical  framework,  decreasing  the  number  of
forms  or legal  types  of enterprises,  changing  decrees  to  eliminate  or
lighten  control  procedures  and  increase  managerial  autonomy,  creating
the  legal  texts  necessary  to implement  privatization,  rationalizing  the
usually  cluttered  scene  with  regard  to supervisory  agencies  --  these  are
the  main legal  themes  under  review.
Other  areas  of policy  reform  attempted  in  adjustment  loans
include  pricing,  labor  issues,  credit  and investment  policy,  and  the
question  of arrears,  both those  between  government  and  public
enterprises,  and  among  the  enterprises  themselves.  PE components  of8
adjustment  operations  in  Senegal,  Benin,  Panama,  Turkey,  Ghana,
Madagascar  and  Morocco,  and  in  most  other  countries,  have  set  tariff
formulae,  in  most  instances  aimed  at  rationalizing  the  way prices  are
set  and  periodically  adjusted. In  adjustment  operatiot.s  in  six
francophone  countries  pricing  issues  have  been addressed  through  support
of the  contract  plan  mechanism. (This  is  an agreement  specifying  the
mutual  obligations  and  rights  of the  owner  --  the  state  --  and  the
enterprise  for  a three  to five  year  period;  it  usually  specifies  pricing
arrangments  for  the  firm. For  a review  of the  mechanism,  see  Nellis,
1988.) Adjustment  operation  conditionality  often  calls  for  studies  on
procedures  of  price  setting  in the  natural  monopoly,  service-providing
PEs,  on  methods  and  timing  for  price  adjustments,  and  on mechanisms  to
improve  billing  and  collection  procedures.
Labor  Rolicies  have featured  prominently  in the  PE  components
of adjustment  operations.  Excess  personnel  is  a common  problem  in  PEs;
substantial  layoffs  will  cut  costs  considerably;  and  the  resulting
savings  in  the  wage  bill  should  provide  resources  to  motivate  the
remaining  workforce. Thus,  reductions  in  staff  and  changes  in
employment  rules  are  conditions  in  twelve  SALs  and  in  a larger  number  of
SECALs. Most  countries  have  approached  workforce  reductions  with
caution. They  are  concerned  about  the  welfare  of the  laborers  affected,
and  they  fear  provoking  labor  unrest,  and  perhaps  organized  political
resistance.  In response  to these  legitimate  concerns,  several  recent  PE
reform  programs,  in  Ghana,  Benin,  Mali  and  Congo  (and  in  several  in
preparation),  have  created  training  and  redeployment  funds,  or supported
forms  of severance  pay.
Reforms  in financial  Rolicy  have  become  prominent  in  PE
components  of  adjustment  operations.  Many  governments  have tried  to
reduce  the  PE  burden  on their  budgets  by simply  declaring  an end  to
direct  subventions  from  the  state. In  many  cases  this  threw  the  PEs  on
to the  national  and international  credit  systems,  which,  in turn,  began
to suffer  the  problems  of  holding  the  non-performing  debts  of PEs.
Attempts  to analyze  this  situation  and  to  propose  reforms,  and  to9
improve,  within  domestic  banks  and/or  reviewing  ministries,  the  quality
of snalysis  of investment  proposals  by PEs,  have  been  called  for  in
Congo  and  Senegal,  and  are  under  consideration  in  most  envisaged  African
PE reform  operations  and  a  proposed  reform  package  for  Mexico.
Strengthening  the  scrutiny  of PE expenditure  and  borrowing,  increasing
PEs'  interest  rates  to  market  levels  (or  at least  to the  rates  paid  by
the  domestic  private  sector)  and  reducing  automatic  access  to  credit,
are  reform  measures  in  at least  fifteen  SALs  and  as  many sector
operations,  across  all  four  regions.
Another  perceived  major  financial  problem  is  that  of  cross-
debts  or arrears. Settlement  of arrears,  and  the  installation  of
mechanisms  to  prevent  thr'r  reoccurence,  is the  key issue  in the
Morrocan  PERL;  clarification,  settlement,  and  the  prevention  of future
cross-debts  between  PEs  and  government,  and  among  PEs  themselves,  is  a
cornerstone  of  most  of the  Sub-Saharan  African  adjustment  loans  and
credits;  examples  ca-a  be seen  in  Niger,  Congo  and  Ghana. A related
issue  is  the  strengthening  of the  budgeting  forecast  and  allocation
system  to  allow  government  to assess  rationally  and  then  to cover  its
financial  commitments  to its  PEs;  this  is a  continuing  theme  of
adjustment  reform  in Senegal  and  elsewhere  --  again  particularly  in
Africa.
Reforms  of the  Institutional  Framework  &  Rehabilitation  of Enterprises
Relations  between  the  PEs  and  the  state  have received  a great
deal  of attention  in every  PERL  and  in  most  SALs  as well.  Portions  of
the  issue  have  also  been  addressed  in  a large  number  of sector
adjustment  operations.  This  general  theme  h-s  been  disaggregated  into
many  parts.
- Creating  or improving  control  and  guidance  agencies,  either  in the
central  managing  organizations  (President's  or Prime  Minister's  Office,
Ministry  of Finance,  Plan,  the  Central  Bank),  or in the  line  technical
ministries  --  particularly  Industry  and  Agriculture  --  or at the  level
of  holding  companies,  are  themes  in  more  than  twenty-five  PE operations.
Though  several  African  countries  have  created  ministries  of state10
enterprises  during  the  period  of Bank-assisted  reform,  in  only  one  case
--  Togo --  has this  bee' a Bank request or adjustment loan requirement.
(Indeed,  the  Bank  has generally  opposed  the  creation  of specific
ministries  of this  nature  on the  grounds  that  in  the  ministerial
competition  for  resources  these  entities  become  uncritical  defenders  of
PEs,  rather  than  performance  stimulators  and  evaluators.)
- Closely  related  is  the  creation  or strengthening  of information  and
monitoring  systems  which  provide  the  data  on PEs  needed  to  guide  and
evaluate  their  performance.  This  is  done  both at the  level  of the  firm
to improve  internal  management,  and  at the  sub-sector  or  national  level,
to  give  essential  information  to  holding  company  or  ministerial
reviewers.  The list  of  more than  twenty-five  operations  which  attempt
to  deal  with this  topic  closely  parallels  the  one  immediately  above.
- Often  touched  upon  are  training  programs  for  government  supervisors
and  evaluators  of PE  operations,  in  both  the  technical  and  central
ministries.
- Reforms  of the  boards  of directors  are  a common  action,  aiming  at
enhancing  the  power  and  autonomy  of the  board,  partly  through  an
enlargment  of the  legal  powers  and  responsibilities  of the  boards;
partly  through  a change  of  board  composition  from  a  majority  of civil
servants  to a  majority  of independent  individuals,  preferably
representatives  of the  private  sector,  creditor  agencies,  user  groups,
chief  suppliers,  technical  experts,  etc.
- One  very important  item  has  been  addressed  more  through  studies  than
by way  of direct  action. Performance  evaluation  based  on  a posteriori
review  of results,  in  comparison  to  pre-set  objectives,  is  often
mentioned  and  is  consistently  regarded  as  highly  desirable. But
performance  evaluation  of this  type  requires  that  the  set  of reforms
previously mentioned --  information  systems, competent monitors, etc. --
largely  be in  place. Thus,  activities  in this  field  have  been  mainly  of
a preparatory  nature,  except  in  Ghana,  in the  Gambia,  in  Korea  --  where
an innovative  performance  evaluation  system  was  supported  in the  single
adjustment opetation --  and in seven francophone countries where
performance  contracts  have  been  or are  being  installed.11
Rehabilitation  of individual  PEs  has  been  equally  multi-
faceted. A  more or less  standard  package  of diagnosis  and  prescription
has  emerged,  trans-regional  in  application.  Diagnostic  studies  of the
problems  of a  key enterprise,  or group  of enterprises,  or of the  sector
as a  whole,  have  been  attempted  in over  fifteen  operations.  Managemernt
and  financial  audits  frequently  follow  the  diagnostic  studies  (in  a
slightly  smaller  number  of operations),  which  then  lead  to recovery
plans  or rehabilitation  Rrograms. (These  actions  have  been called  for
directly  in the  adjustment  operations,  or they  have  been  enacted  in
accompanying  technical  assistance  loans.) A common  theme  across
countries  and  regions  is the  weakness  of accounting  practices  at the
level  of the  firm;  adjustment  operations  or the  parallel  projects
propose  training  or technical  assistance  in  many instances. In
francophone  countries,  and  increasingly  in  anglophone  African
operations,  contract  Rlans  or performance  agreements  (mentioned  above)
are  being  initiated  and  installed  in those  PEs  working  in largely  non-
competitive  markets. Training  at the  level  of the  firm  has  been
featured  in sixteen  adjustment  operations,  and  is  a prominent  part  of
most  of the  PERLs  in  preparation. Finally,  caRital  suDport  and
restructuring  has  been advanced  in only  five  operations,  four  in Sub-
Saharan  Africa,  and in  Turkey.
Divestiture
Divestiture  refers  to the  full  range  of mechanisms  by which  the
state  reduces  its  direct  involvement  in the  economy: the  full  or
partial  sale/transfer  of ownership,  the  sale  of assets,  leasing
arrangements,  contracting  out,  and  liquidation  (in  its  various  forms).
Close  to forty  adjustment  operations  have  contained  divestiture
elements,  in  most  cases  centering  on the  issue  of the  full  or partial
sale  of ownership. The  sale  of a specifically  named  enterprise  or set
of enterprises  has  been  clearly  set  out  in  loan  or credit  conditions  in
only  five  adjustment  cases: Senegal,  Ghana,  Jamaica,  Panama  and  Guinea.12
The  closure  and  liquidation  of specific  PEs  has  been a su6bject  for
conditionality  in seven  countries,  six  of them  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa:
Senegal,  CAR,  Guinea,  Niger,  Benin,  Burundi  and  Panama.
A more  common  form  of divestiture  conditionality  requires  that
governments  prepare,  and  discuss  with the  Bank,  studies,  consultants'
reports  or action  plans  on the  classifications  of enterprises,  and  the
future  of problem  enterprises,  the  best  course  of action  for  which  is  a
matter  of dispute  between  the  Bank  and  the  government  (with  the  Bank
generally  favoring  divestiture,  and  the  government,  restructuring).
Adjustment  operation  conditions  often  require  investigation  of or
progress  on privatization;  not  the  sale  of a  particular  enterprise.
Recurring  phrases  are:  government  will "initiate  a divestiture  program;"
"will  agree  with  IDA  on a strategy  for  rationalization  and  disengagement
of the  state  enterprise  sector;"  "will  implement  a divestiture  program;"
"will  accelerate  its  program  on divestiture;"  and  government's  progress
on divestiture  "will  be satisfactory  to  the  Bank." Such  phrases  --  most
all  in the  future  or  conditional  tense  --  are  common  in  adjustment
operation  documents,  occuring  in  at least  twenty-five  operations,
roughly  half  of them  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa. The intention,  of course,
is that  the  future  tense  will  change  to the  present  as the  scheduled
divestitures  occur.  (There  are  several  sound  financial  and  economic
reasons  for  this  vagueness,  discussed  below.) Hard  conditionality  on
divestiture  is  concentrated  in the  smaller  and  poorer  countries  of
Africa.
Other  divestiture  actions  have  been  scattered;  they  include
leasing  arrangements  (prominent  in  Togo)  and  management  contracts
(common  in  hotel  sectors). There  has  been  relatively  little
experimentation  in  adjustment  operations  with such  matters  as the
contracting  out  to  private  suppliers  of services  performed  by public
enterprises,  though  these  matters  are  often  raised  or  proposed  in the
many  consultants'  reports  prepared  in  the  framework  of the  adjustment
operations.13
Ill.  An Assessment  of  Results
PE aspects  of  adjustment  lending  pose  at least  two  problems  for
the  evaluator: (i)  many  of the  objectives  set  by these  reforms,
particularly  the  many that  are  in the  institutional  realm,  have  been
qualitative  in  nature;  they  have  not  been,  and  perhaps  cannot  be,
designed  in  such  a  way that  renders  them  easily  subject  to  precise
measurement;  and  (ii)  in  some  of the  cases  where  the  desired  outcome
can  be precisely  stated,  several  years  of effort  and implementation  will
be required  before  one  can  assess  whether  or  not the  objective  has  been
achieved. There  are  also  elements  whicb  are  qualitative  in nature  and
long  term  as  well.  With  regard  to the  first  problem,  one is  thr.wn  back
on impressionistic  assessments  of  where  progress  has  been  satisfactory
or not.  While  these  qualitative  judgements  can  be of some  benefit,  they
are  obviously  less  than  ideal. The  second  problem  is  equally
intractable;  not  many  of the  PE-related  adjustment  operations  have  been
in  place  long  enough  to  permit  a judgement  on  which  targets  have  been
hit  and  which  missed.
Therefore,  in this  exercise  an attempt  is  made  to assess  the
experience  of that  group  of countries  in  which:
(a)  PE  reforms  have figured  prominently  in  adjustment  operations;
(b)  the  reforms  have  been in  place  long  enough  to produce  at least  some
discussable  (if  sometimes  not  measureable)  results;  and
(c)  the  results  have  been  reviewed  by Bank  staff.
Countries  meeting  these  criteria  are: Ghana,  Ivory  Coast,  Jamaica,
Morocco,  Niger,  Panama,  Senegal,  Togo  and  Turkey. Prima  facie,  the  list
is  representative  of PE-related  adjustment  operations:  just  over  half
Sub-Saharan  African,  and  mostly  smaller  countries.14
What  has  been tried?
Table  3  presents  information  on the  type  and  frequency  of PE
reforms  attempted  in the  thirty-one  adjustment  operations  in the  nine
countries. The figures  require  some  interpretation.  First,  with  regard
to  divestiture,  the  numbers  do  not  mean  that  there  were  twenty-nine
different  programs. Privatization  actions  started  in Togo  I, for
example,  were  pursued  and  deepened  in  Togo II  an III,  and  the  same  is
the  case for  Jamaica,  Senegal  and  Niger,  all  of which  have  had at least
two  adjustment  operations.  These  were  countries  where  subsequent
adjustment  operations  reinforced  and  surpassed  initial  efforts,  or  wheze
a second  or third  try  was  needed  to launch  a  divestiture,  or  --  most
commonly  --  where  the  original  timetable  proved  to  be overly  ambitious
and  more time  was  needed  to  prepare  and  complete  the  arrangements.  This
said,  it is still  true  that  divestiture  reforms  were  far  and  away  the
most common  efforts  in this  set  of operations. 2 They  were followed  by
roughly  equal  emphasis  on the  issues  of  pricing  reforms,  institutional
strengthening,  and  rehabilitation  in  specific  enterprises.
A  second  point  is that  the  set  of actions  noted  in  Table  3
contains  the  same  wide range  of reform  activities  reviewed  in  section
II.  But  whereas  the  overall  review  indicated  that  preparation  for
divestiture  was  more  common  than  emphasis  on actual  sales  or closures,
in  the  smaller  sample  the  opposite  is  clearly  the  case:  implementation
actions  are  almost  three  times  more  numerous  than  preparation
activities.  Moreover,  the  conditionality  called  for  in  the  divestitures
in  the  sample  tends  to  be precise  and  action-oriented;  in  Niger,
Jamaica,  Panama  and  Togo in  particular.  This  leads  to  the  third  point:
many of the  PE  reforms  initiated  in this  particular  group  of countries
tend  to  be concrete,  measureabLe  and  monitorable.  Enterprises  are
2/  This  confirms  the  conclusions  of  other  studies  (Shirley/Kikeri;
1987),  which  listed  divestiture  actions  as the  private  sector
development  issue  most  often  tackled  in  Bank  operations.15
TABLE  3
TYPE AND FREOUENCY OF SOE REFORMS IN
ADJUSTMENT OPERATIONS IN SAMPLE COUNTRIES
REFORM  NUMBER  OF OPERATIONS  IN  WHICH
REFORM IS STRESSED
DIVESTITURE
Implement full or partial sale,  21
lease or liquidate
Examine cases, classify, set  8
policy, prepare
PRICING ISSUES  15
Increases, decontrols, enter-
prise autonomy, studies
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK  15
Strengthen review and guidance
bodies, improve monitoring
systems, reform boards, etc.
REHAB & RESTRUCTURING IN SPECIFIC FIRMS  15
REDUCE WORKFORCE  12
FINANCIAL AUDITS OF TROUBLED SOEs  11
PRODUCE SOE POLICY STATEMENTS  10
CROSS-DEBTS/ARREARS SETTLEMENT  9
CONTRACT-PLANS  7
REDUCE TRANSFERS AND SUBVENTIONS  6
MANAGEMENT AUDITS OF TROUBLED SOi,s  4
Reforms in three or less adjustment operations include:
Financial restructuring, training, export promotion in SOEs, elimination  of
monopolies, revising legal framework, specifying rates of return on assets,
corporate plans, reforming  pay scales for management, increasing
competition, and subsidy/credit  reform.16
either  sold  or closed  or they  are  not;  prices  are  either  increased  by
the  assigned  date,  by the  stipulated  percentage  or they  are  not;  workers
are  either  dismissed  from  an enterprise  or they  are  not (though  whether
they  stay  dismissed  is  another  matter);  and  the  same  is  true  for  the
production  of financial  sudits,  contract-plans,  rehabilitation  plans,
etc. Thus,  one  is  provided  with  a record  to review.
What  has  1laDpened?
First,  with  regard  to  divestiture:  privatization  and
liquidation  of  PEs,  or  preparation  for  divestiture,  featured  in
adjustment  operations  in  eight  of the  nine  countries. Adjustment  loans
signed  in  Turkey  did  not  deal  directly  with divestiture  (the  energy
SECAL  contained  a  minor  reference  to  the  process),  but large  scale
privatization  was the  leading  element  in a  Turkey  PERL,  the  three-year
preparations  for  which  were  halted  at the  request  of the  Turkish
government  --  without  any  enterprise  having  been  sold.  In contrast,  in
Niger,  Togo,  Panama  and  Jamaica,  all  of the  divestiture  eit.ier
stipulated  or suggested  in  adjustment  operations  has  been  carried  out,
or is in  an active  stage  of  preparation.
In  Panama,  for  example,  even  though  the  second  tranche
disbursement  of SAL  II  was cancelled  (at  the  request  of the  government),
five  of the  scheduled  seven  divestitures  were  completed. In  Jamaica,
the  government  was  committed  under  the  PERL  to  divest  its  PE portfolio
by a  value  of $150  million  (J)  by 12/87;  it  far  exceeded  the  goal  by
divesting  to the  value  of $500  million  (J). Thirty-two  of the  forty-
five  firms  on the  list  for  divestiture  were  fully  or  partially
privatized,  leased  or dissolved  by November  of 1987.  In  Togo,  four  PEs
have  been leased  to  private  operators. The  most  well-known  of these
four  is the  steel  mill,  the  STS,  a financial  and  political  success  but  a
dubious  economic  proposition.  The  management  of a  clothing  firm  has
been  handed  over  to a  private  sector  Togolese  national;  one  of the  first
examples  of a management  contract  being  given  to  an African17
entrepreneur.  Two  PE textile  firms  were  merged  and  a sale  was
negotiated  --  but  was  at the  last  moment  subjected  to serious  delays  --
with  a Korean-American  group. Five  PEs  were liquidated  and  their  assets
sold. Almost  twenty  other  commercial  and industrial  PEs  are  on the
sales  block;  arrangements  for  several  are  quite  advanced. In  Niger,  as
of 12/87,  three  PEs  had  been  fully  privatized,  eight  partially
privatized,  four  liquidated,  and  divestiture  work  was in  course  for
eight  other  PEs. With regard  to financial  and  economic  impact,  there
are  drawbacks  and  problems  in  many  of the  cases  cited;  some  of these  are
reviewed  below. The conclusion  is that  in these  fou.  cases  divestiture
conditions  of adjustment  agreements  have  substantially  been  met.
In  Ghana's  SAL  I,  a condition  of second  tranche  release  was
that  divestiture  be initiated  in at least  ten  PEs (one  of which  was
specified  by name). The  objective  was that  five  companies  would  be put
on the  market,  and  five  inactive  PEs  would  be prepared  for  liquidation.
A March,  1988,  Bank  report  notes  that  some  preparatory  work  has  been
completed  but that  "no  decisions  have  yet  been taken." In a statement
that  could  easily  be applied  to a  number  of countries  and  divestiture
cases,  the  report  argues:
This  slow  progress  need  not  be construed  as lack  of
commitment  or effort  on the  part  of the  Government,
but,  rather  as  reflecting  the  inherent  difficulties
associated  with  the  implementation  of such  a
program.
In  Morocco,  the  PERL  and  various  other  SECALs  have  emphasized
studies  and  preparation  rather  than  overt  action  (though  the
agricultural  SECAL  required  some  action  on a liquidation;  the  status  of
which  is  unknown.) In the  case  of the  PERL,  this  was  a conscious
choice. The  reasoning  was that  first,  one  should  improve  the  policy
framework  and  the  transparency  of  PE operations.  Then  --  having  shown
government  that  the  Bank's  concern  is  efficiency  gains,  and  that
ownership  issues  are  secondary;  i.e.,  one  of  many  mechanisms  used  to18
achieve  those  gains  --  would  the  issue  of  divestiture  be broached. The
Moroccan  PERL  thus  calls  for  consideration,  studies  and  classifications,
and  a draft  law  on  privatization,  all  of  which  were  achieved  on
schedule. (The  King  of Morocco,  in  his speech  opening  Parliament  on
April  8, 1988,  announced  a  major  privatization  initiative.)  The
divestiture  question  will  receive  more  concrete  attention  in the
proposed  PERL  II.
Senegal  has  moved  very  slowly  on divestiture,  exhibiting  the
full  range  of difficulties  in  the  privatization  process: reluctance  to
sell  to foreigners,  fear  of concentration  of ownership  of divested
firms,  difficulty  of reconciling  market  value  with  book  value,  and
problems  of finding  an  appropriate  and  transparent  sales  mechanism  in
the  absence,  or  extreme  thin-ness,  of an  equities  market. Thus,  though
studies  and  preparation  for  divestiture  have  figured  in  adjustment
lending  since  1980,  it  was  only  in SAL  III  (1987-88)  that  more demanding
conditionality  on the  issue  was introduced.  Results  are  modest. In
October  of 1987  the  "Special  Commission  on the  Disengagement  of the
State"  published  a list  of ten  PEs  in  which  the  share  of state  ownership
was  to  be reduced  by the  sale  of stock  issues. In only  two  of the  ten
would  ownership  pass  from  majority  public  to  majority  private;  in  the
rest  it  was a  matter  of reducing  or eliminating  government's  already
minority  share. The  accompanying  explanations  left  many technical  and
mechanical  questions  unanswered. In  early  1988,  the  government
published  a second  list  of ten  further  firms  which  were to  be put  up for
sale. But  they  removed  from  the  first  list  two  of the  larger  firms,
stating  that  they  needed  restructuring  prior  to sale. No buyers  have
yet  been  found  for  any  of the  enterprises  on either  list. Government
has  managed  to liquidate  seven  small  enterprises  (that  in total
accounted  for  one  percent  of government  equity  in  the  non-financial  PE
sector),  but  has  not fulfilled  its  commitment  to identify  a second  list
of PEs  to  be closed.  The  conclusion  is  that  on this  issue  Senegal  is
creeping  forward, without  enthusiasm,  at  a pace  far  slower  than
anticipated.19
In the  Ivory  Coast,  conditionality  in  SAL  II  was  met  by the
liquidation  of two  of the  six  sugar  firms.
The first  lesson  learned  from  these  experiences  in divestiture
under  adjustment  lending  is  that  the  process  takes  longer  than
anticipated.  Divestiture  is  not  an issue  easily  synchronized  with  rapid
loan  disbursement.  Trying  to  make it  so usually  only  makes  matters
worse. For  example,  specifying  a date  by which  a particular  enterprise
must  be sold  can  be counterproductive,  as  purchasers  will  wait until  the
deadline  nears,  and  offer  low  prices;  and  governments  will feel  obliged
to accept  either  low  prices,  or offers  contingent  upon government
granting  protection  or  competition-reducing  distortions. (This  is  the
case  in the  privatization  of a group  of firms  in a  country  not in  the
paper's  sample. In the  Guinea  divestiture  program,  which  was a  matter
of strong  conditionality  in  its  SAL,  of fourteen  companies  sold  five
were transfered  as  monopolies,  and  a fifth  company  was given  the  right
to import  fuel  oil,  duty free,  for  fifteen  years.)
The  second  lesson  is  that  while  most  governments  concerned  are
showing  compliance,  albeit  with  varying  degrees  of speed  and  enthusiasm,
with  divestiture  conditions  and  suggestions,  there  is,  as  yet, little
information  on the  crucial  question  of the  post-privatization
performance  of the  entities  sold. A small  feeder  airline  privatized  in
Panama  has  expanded  its  fleet  and  opened  new  routes. Private  traders
allowed  to compete  with  a food-distributing  PE in  Niger  are  providing
more  goods  at lower  prices  to a greater  number  of outlets;  and  the  PE
itself,  faced  with  competition,  has  cut  costs  and is  now  making  a
profit. In countries  where  divestiture  has taken  place,  there  are  a
fair  number  of encouraging  anecdotes  of this  nature. But  anecdotes,  no
matter  how consistent  with the  tenets  of  neo-classical  economics,  do  not
amount  to a  conclusive  demonstration  of  a generalized  superior
capability  of the  private  sector  to  put  resources  to efficient  use.
Future  review  work  must  concentrate  on this  essential  issue.20
A third  lesson  is that  the  Bank  has  not  proven  to  be
particularly  adept  at advising  governments  on the  timing  or detailed
mechanics  of privatization  ventures. For  example,  when  Togo received
two  offers  for  its  textile  PEs,  the  Ministry  of State  Enterprises  asked
for  advice  on which  offer  was the  better. The  Bank  group  provided  a
detailed  report  on the  pros  and  cons  of the  two  offers. The report  was
circumspect,  but  clearly  favored  the  offer  which  proposed  to (a)  bring
in  more restructuring  capital,  (b)  create  more  jobs  in  Togo,  and (c)
produce  for  export  rather  than  produce  behind  barriers  for  the  domestic
market. There  can  be no doubt  that  from  an  economic  point  of  view,
offer  one  was clearly  superior  to  offer  two. Offer  one  was duly
accepted. But  the  investors  were then  unable  to  raise  the  stipulated
amount  of restructuring  capital,  and  the  conclusion  of the  sale  was
delayed. This  led  some  Togolese  to think  that  the  second,  smaller,  more
traditional offer --  which would undoubtedly have gone through more
rapidly --  should have been taken.  The point is not that the Bank
group's  economic  advice  was  bad;  on the  contrary,  it  was good. The
issue,  rather,  is  that  economic  analysis  is  only  part  of the  deal-making
process.
The fourth  and  final  lesson  is  an obvious  one:  liberalization
should  precede,  or at  a minimum  advance  in  parallel,  with  privatization.
Above  all,  privatization  must  not  become  an obstacle  to liberalization
(this  could  happen  when  new,  protected  and  powerful  private  owners  take
steps  to  prevent  further  liberalization).  The  point  is  simple:
divesting  into  uncompetitive  markets  may  do  more  harm than  good.  In
practical  terms,  this  means  taking  more time  in adjustment  operations  to
first,  or at the  same  time,  reform  the  policy  and  regulatory
environment,  to  enhance  competitive  forces,  so that  privatization  can
produce  the  needed  efficiency  and  productivity  benefits. Recent  actions
of the  Togolese  government,  in the  forefront  of  privatizers,  are
illustrative:  the  government  has  become  concerned  about  the  nature  and
pace  of the  divestiture  arrangements  so far  concluded,  to the  point21
where  it  has  announced  a "pause"  in  privatization  actions. The  Bank  has
supported  the  evaluation/consolidation  pause,  and in  SAL  III  is
concentrating  more  on eliminating  remaining  policy  distortions  a,nd
reforming  the  industrial  incentive  system  than  on numbers  and  dates  for
the  sale  of PEs.
Pricing.  Policy  Reforms  and  Rehabilitation
Pricing  issues  have  featured  prominently  in  about  half the
operations  under  review. In the  vast  majority  of cases,  called-for
price  increases  have  been  achieved: in Turkey,  Jamaica,  Togo,  the  Ivory
Coast,  Morocco  and  Niger. Compliance  has  not  generally  been a  problem.
Contrary  to usual  practice,  action  has  proven  easier  than  contemplation,
as pricing  studies  in several  countries  have taken  much  longer  to  mount
and  review  than  anticipated.  (It  may  be well that  calling  for  a
"study"  is  the  way the  Bank  and  the  borrower  government  agree  to resolve
disputes  over  particularly  contentious  pricing  issues,  thus  accounting
for  the  slow  pace  of these  actions.)  The  lengthy  and  well-studied
Turkish  experience  is  particularly  interesting  in  regard  to price
issues.  The  Turkish  government's  primary  goal  in  PE reform  was
reduction  of the  burden  on the  budget  posed  by resource-consuming
enterprises.  Among  the  measures  put forward  in  various  SALs  were a
variety  of tariff  adjustments  and  increases.  As they  were enacted  the
financial  position  of the  enterprises  improved;  and  government  transfers
remained  even  and  then  declined. But it  has  been  argued,  in a Bank
evaluation  report,  that  financial  improvements  came  about  because  the
monopoly  PEs  were allowed  to  raise  prices;  and  that  no efficiency  gains
can  be observed  in the  utility  enterprises  in question,  or indeed  in the
sector  as a whole.
In  Jamaica,  the  loss-making  railway  raised  its  tariffs,  laid
off  substantial  numbers  of workers,  and  closed  several  uneconomic  lines;
all  in the  framework  of  various  SALs. Jamaica  and  Turkey  are  but two
instances  where  the  financial  positions  of firms  were  improved  through22
pricing  revisions,  but  where  the  results  in  terma  of  efficiency  gains
are  unknown  or  unobserved. In  the  Jamaican  railway  case,  presumably,
cost  cutting  measures  such  as staff  reductions  and  line  closures  also
contributed  in the  long  run  to the  return  to  profitability.  But it  is
not  possible  on the  basis  of  available  data  to sort  out  which  element
accounted  for  the  greater  percentage  of the  variance.
The  degree  of compliance  with  staff  reduction  requirements  and
requests  has  been  high,  indeed  surprisingly  so,  given  the  politically
sensitive  nature  of the  issue. Ghana  is  the  outstanding  case,  where,  in
a two  year  period,  the  infamously  over-staffed  COCOBOD  (cocoa  board)
lost  54,013  names  from  its  staff  list  --  25,000  "ghost,"  or  non-existent
workers  were  eliminated  from  the  payroll,  and  a further  29,013  staff
were "retrenched."  This  was  in response  to conditionality  in the  SAL
specifying  that "excess  labor"  would  be identified  and  eliminated.
Early  SALs  in  Turkey  had  requested  or required  the  same  sorts  of
programs;  30,000  workers  were  laid  off  from  PEs  over  the  four  year
period  1979  - 1982.  Staff  reductions  of a significant  if less  dramatic
nature  have  taken  place  in  Niger,  Togo,  Panama,  Jamaica  and  the  Ivory
Coast.  (The  labor  issue  was  not  addressed  in the  Moroccan  PERL.) The
layoff  program  in  Ghana  is  presently  running  into  difficulties,  not
because  of an exhaustion  of political  will to  continue  the  staff
reductions,  but  because  of lack  of resources  to fund  tl.e  generous
severance  pay  agreements  previously  agreed  to  by the  PE-.
The  pace  and  impact  of enterprise-level  rehabilitation  and
restructuring  varies  greatly  from  country  to country. Management  and
financial  performance  improvements  are  reported  in five  key  PEs  in the
Ivory  Coast,  in  several  formerly  troubled  firms  in  Jamaica,  and  across
the  board  in  Turkey. In the  Jamaican  case  the  assertions  are  backed  by
data  on improved  performance  as  measured  by  physical  and  financial
indicators;  in the  Turkish  instance  the  improved  macro-financial
situation  is taken  as a  proxy  for  improvements  at the  level  of the  firm.
In  Sub-Saharan  Africa  much  of the  rehabilitation  work  under  adjustment23
operations  has  been  of a diagnostic,  prepatory  nature: financial  and
management  audits,  consultants'  reports  and  proposals,  impioved  capacity
to review  investment  proposals,  training  programs,  etc.  Once  again,  and
particularly  in  Africa,  the  proposed  schedules  for  these  activities  have
consistently  underestimated  the  time  needed  to  mount  and  implement  them.
This  is further  confirmation  of the  often  made  point  that  there  is  a
poor fit  between  the  time  frame  needed  to effect  X-efficiency
improvements  and  adjustment  disbursement  schedules.
The fact  that  Bank-supported  PE  reform  has  been  underway  for
ten  years  in Senegal  means  that  there  is  a clear  record  to  evaluate  with
regard  to improvements  in  enterprises.  And  indeed  one  can  point  to
improvements:  in  financial  and  management  information  systems,  in
objective  setting  (through  the  contract  plan  system,  discussed  below),
in  pricing  policies,  and  especially  in  accounting  and  auditing;  all  of
these  associated  with  adjustment  operations. But  the  economic  impact
of these  reforms  is  less  easy  to discern. The  sector  continues  to  make
financial  losses,  and  the  trend  is downwards. In 1982-84  the  sector
lost  on  average  4  billion  F CFA  a  year;  in 1986,  public  enterprises  lost
7.8  billion  F  CFA.  (A  significant  part  of the  loss  is  due to  price
supports  to farmers  paid through  rural  development  PEs,  and  cannot
necessarily  be attributed  to  operating  inefficiencies.)  Presumably,  the
counter  factual  argument  applies: losses  would  have  been  greater
without  the  adjustment  associated  reforms. There  are  more  encouraging
signs  in that  debts  of the  PEs  have  declined  over  the  past  three  or four
years,  and  that  operating  subsidies  to  PEs  have  been reduced,  by five
percent  in 1986,  and  by a further  fifteen  percent  in the  1987-88  budget.
Senegal  has  had  extensive  experience  with the  performance
agreement,  or  contract  Rlan  process. The  results  have  been  less  than
encouraging.  Goals  have  been  set,  the  mutual  responsibilities  and
commitments  of the  two  contracting  parties  clearly  set  out,  and
performance  measures  clearly  established.  In the  financial  field,
tariff  regimes  have  been specified,  investment  programs  stated,  non-
commerical  operations  costed  out  and  compensation  arranged  for,  and
operating  subsidies  set --  but in  case  after  case  the  government  has24
proven  unable  or unwilling  to  honor  the  financial  commitments  agreed
upon;  and  the  agreements  have  had  to  be repeatedly  and  extensively
revised,  or  have fallen  into  abeyance.  Experience  with the  device  in
the  other  countries  in  the  sample  using  the  contract  plan,  the  Ivory
Coast,  Niger  and  Togo,  is  insufficiently  advanced  to  permit  an
assessment.  However,  the  first  months  of  experience  with the  contract
plans  negotiated  in  Morocco  (their  signing  was  a condition  of the  PERL)
have  been  positive;  with  government  honoring,  for  the  first  time  in
years,  financial  commitments  in two  key  firms.
Some  progress  has  been  made  on reducing  transfers  and
subventions.  A direct  approach  was  pioneered  in  Turkey,  where  SAL  IV
specified  that in  1983  investments  in  PEs  were to  be  held to 6.5  percent
of  GNP,  and  that  overall  PE financing  was  not to  exceed  5.9  percent  of
GNP.  SAL  V noted  that  the  actual  figures  were 7.2  and  6.4  percent,
respectively.  Nonetheless,  overall  transfers  were  substantially  reduced
from  previously  prevailing  levels. (The  approach  was  not  repeated  in
SAL  V.)  Senegal  manged  to  reduce  operating  subsidies  to  PEs  by the
tactic  of simply  decreeing  that  total  subsidies  in  year  X will  be Y
percent  less  than  the  previous  year.  The  reductions  were  conditions  of
SAL  III.
Institutional  Reforms
Reforms  of the  Rolicy-making.  supervsing  and  evaluating
institutions  have  absorbed  considerable  attention  and  resources  in all
the  countries  in the  sample. In  Ghana,  Togo,  Niger,  the  Ivory  Coast  and
particularly  in  Senegal  and  Morocco,  Bank-supported  efforts  are  underway
to strengthen  the  data  base  and  monitoring/managerial  capacity  of the
central  institutions  guiding  public  enterprises.  A central  theme  of
reform  is to shift  government  supervision  away  from  extensive  and  rigid
a priori  controls  and  approvals,  towards  a smaller  number  of more
flexible  a  posteriori  evaluation  mechanisms.  Contract  plans,  reforms  of25
boards  of directors,  lightening  financial  review  procedures,  increasing
management's  latitude  while  at the  same  time  increasing  the  competence
and  capacity  of government  supervisors,  legal  changes  placing  more
enterprises  in  the  more lightly  supervised  categories  --  these  are  but
some  of the  institutional  changes  being  introduced.  For  countries  other
than  Senegal,  about  all  that  one  can  reasonably  say  at this  stage  is
that  the  process  has  been launched,  and  that  first  signs  are
encouraging.
For  example,  in  Morocco  the  PERL-supported  Directorate  of
Public  Enterprises  (Ministry  of Finance)  is,  inter  alia:
- supervising  the  contract  plan  preparation  process,  and  ensuring  that
the  Treasury  honors  its  financial  commitments;
- drafting  legislation  on divestiture  procedures;
- utilizing  consultants  to  build  a data  base  on and  an  MIS  for
the  sector;
- advising  a central  policy-making  committee  on PE strategy  in  general;
- coordinating  a training  program  for  government  and  enterprise  staff;
- building  a  management  information  system;
- supervising  the  complicated  arrears  clearance  process;  and
- conducting  studies  on  various  key  questions  such  as the  optimal  powers
and  composition  of Boards  of Directors.
In each  sub-field  obstacles  remain  serious  and  numerous,  but  in
general,  the  Directorate  is showing  dynamism  and  commitment  in  attacking
problems,  and  is serving  as the  focal  point  for  the  dissemination  of a
changed  and  positive  attitude  regarding  the  need  to render  PEs
efficient. PERL  preparations  and  conditionality  asF 4 sted  the  policy
changes  which  placed  the  Directorate  in its  enhanced  position;  resources
furnished  under  the  PERL  provide  for  the  consultants  and training  being
used  by the  Directorate.26
Roughly  similar  strengthening  measures  are  being  supported  in
Niger,  Ghana  and  Togo;  early  SALs  did  the  same  in  Turkey,  with modestly
positive  results. In Senegal,  assistance  under  SALs  and  related  TA
loans  to the  Court  of Public  Enterprise  Accounts  has  allowed  that  body
to  become  an  effective,  respected  organization. On the  other  hand,  the
main  PE supervising  agency  in  Senegal,  located  in the  Office  of the
President,  has  not  so far  played  its  anticipated  role  --  despite
considerable  input  from  the  Bank.  One  problem  has  been  rapid  turnover
in its  leadership,  a second  the  junior  status  and  lack  of experience  of
its  cadre,  and  the  third,  the  inability  of this  organization  to effect
needed  changes  in  the  budgeting  system  which  would  better  reconcile
government  commitments  with  revenues. The  weakness  in  this  regard  is
revealed  in  the  recent  contract  plan  experience.  Of course,  one  cannot
reasonably  expect  one  small  agency  to  overcome  singlehandedly  the
poverty  and  deficiencies  of an entire  system;  moreover,  recent  changes
in  the  organization's  management  and  personnel  are  expected  to lead  to
improvements  in  performance.27
IV.  Conclusions
Adjustment  operations  have required  or requested: divestiture
(in  all its  many forms);  policy  changes,  particularly  w'th regard  to
pricing;  reduction,  and  measures  aimed  at  better  management  of the
resources  usea  by the  enterprises,  including  labor;  improved  guidance
and  evaluation  by the  state,  and  restructuring  and  rehabilitation  at the
level  of the  firm.  So far  there  has  been a  variable  but generally
acceptable  degree  of compliance  with  conditionality.  Adjustment
operations  have  underlined  both  the  importance  and  the  intractability  of
the  institutional  issues  in  public  enterprise  retorm: management,
guidance  and  performance  evaluation.  Progress  in these  fields  is slow,
and  subject  to  wide  variation  from  country  to  country.  Across  the
board,  but in  the  institutitional  realm  especially,  much  remains  to  be
done. There  is  little  information  on the  post-privatization  performance
of divested  firms,  and  --  disturbingly  --  little  evidence  that
efficiency  gains  have  been  responsible  for  the  perceived  improvement  in
the  financial  situations  of many  enterprises  (improvement  seems  largely
attributable  to across  the  board  investment  cuts  and  price  increases  in
monopolies). Nonitheless,  many  governments  have,  under  adjustment
operations,  succeeded  in reducing  the  flow  of resources  into  poorly
performing  public  enterprise  sectors.
More specifically,  in  the  nine  countries  reviewed  (and  there  is
no reason  to  believe  this  is  an  unrepresentative  sample),  viewed  over
the  whole  of the  period  of  adjustment,  one  discerns:
- a freeze  on employment  in  PEs,  and  in several  instances  a
reduction  in  numbers  of  employees,  sometime  substantial;
- a freeze  in the  creation  of new  PEs,  and in  many instances
a reduction  in  their  number,  through  divestiture  and
amalgamation  into  the  regular  line  administrations;28
- a general  but  not  universal  reduction  in the  burden  on the
budgets  posed  by PE sectors  (mainly  thtough  price
increases,  investment  cuts  and  staff  layoffs);
- considerable  increases  in  the  quantity,  quality  and
transparency  of information  on PE  performance,  physical,
financial  and  economic;
- widespread  experimentation  with  institutional  mechanisms
to  better  monitor  and  manage  state  enterprises;
- equally  widesorad  experimentation  with  private  sectors  as
alternate  users  of the  resources  previously  invested  in
PEs.
These  are  not terribly  dramatic  advances,  but  they  are  steps  forward.
Much of the  PE reform  presently  being  instituted  through
adjustment  operations  can  be regarded  as  preliminary  or "brush-clearing"
steps;  i.e.,  difficult,  tedious  and  time-consuming  measures  which  do not
individually  or immediately  turn  the  firms  around,  but  which  set  the
scene  for  more  dramatic  improvments.  The  complexity  and  slow  pace  of
the  reform  packages  being  implemented  is  regrettable,  but  probably
unavoidable. The  "simple"  solutions  --  getting  prices  right,  selling
off  the  industrial  and  commerical  PEs  which  are  not  natural  monopolies
--  have  proven  to  be either  not  so simple  or only  partial  solutions  --
though  both are,  and  will  continue  to  be, of  critical  importance.
The  reform  packages  for  PEs  proposed  and  implemented  under
adjustment  operations  have  been  based  on available  "best  practice;"
i.e.,  prevailing  economic/managerial  wisdom  and  international  experience
concerning  performance  improvement.  The  anticipated  major  macroeconomic
benefit  of these  reforms,  as  measured  first  by a reduction  in  the  flow29
of funds  from  governments  to SOEs,  has  come  about  in  many  countries  --
Turkey,  Jamaica  and  latterly  in  Niger  and  Ghana  --  but  has  not  yet taken
place  in  others  --  in Senegal  and  for  a surprising  example,  Togo,
despite  its  lead  role  on  privatization.  But  reduction  of the  burden  on
the  budget,  no  matter  how important  in  the  short-run,  is  not  the
ultimate  justification  for  reform. In  the  long-run,  the  value  of the
reforms  will  be measured  by the  extent  to  which  they  promote  efficiency.
On this  crucial  issue,  the  data  are  not  yet  sufficient  to  reach  a
conclusion.
The  World  Bank  should  continue  to  move  away,  in adjustment
conditionality,  from  specification  of  numbers  of PEs  to  be sold  by date
X; this  is  counterproductive.  The  Jamaican  PE restructuring  loan,  with
its  specification  of divestiture  of a  dollar  amount  of the  state
portfolio,  is  worth  further  examination  by those  who favor  concrete  goal
setting. But  in  general,  the  divestiture  process  is too  uncertain  to
allow  the  setting  of a date,  especially  in the  short-term.  Further,  it
appears  unwise  to  make  purely  institutional  PE reforms  a  matter  of  hard
conditionality.  (Why? Because  the  time-frame  for  their  design  and
implementation  exceeds  that  of several  SALs. Institutional  development
projects,  running  in  parallel  to  adjustment  operations,  may  be one
solution  to this  perplexing  problem.)  -Some  of the  factors  involved  in
meeting  such  conditionality  lie  outside  the  control  of governments;
moreover,  it  is  unlikely  that  institutional  reform  will "make  or break"
an adjustment  operation. Indeed,  the  Bank  might  consider  nuancing  the
concept  of conditionality,  establishing  "primary  conditions"  --  a few,
key,  clear,  easily  monitored  objectives,  the  lack  of complete
fulfillment  of  which  would  bring  an operation  to a  halt --  and
"secondary  conditions."  The  latter,  in  which  would  be included  most
institutional  and  indeed  PE reforms  in  general,  would  provoke  sanctions
for  non-fulfillment  of a less  than  program-ending  nature.30
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